A convenient culprit for Lebanon’s port blast

All Lebanon’s political factions and ex-warlords are to blame for the massive blast in Beirut port that devastated three nearby neighbourhoods at a time when the country’s economy has collapsed and cases of Covid-19 are surging. However, some Lebanese and external actors are trying to pin most responsibility on the powerful Shia Hizbollah movement. Their aim, of course, is to weaken Hizbollah politically and force it to demobilise and disarm its military wing.

Conspiracy theories abound. The most prevalent holds that planes heard or seen above the port before the August 4th explosion had loosed missiles at warehouse 12 that detonated deadly and destructive ammonium nitrate.

According to this theory, Hizbollah had stored weapons and ammunition in or near this facility. Therefore, Hizbollah’s inveterate enemy, Israel, is seen as the logical source of the attack. After all, Israeli warplanes violate Lebanese airspace continually with surveillance flights and to launch missiles at targets in Syria.

However, investigators have found no evidence of weapons or ammunition while port officials have admitted that, on orders from the transport authorities, the warehouse had been used to store all flammable materials unclaimed by importers. These included 2,700 tonnes of weapons grade ammonium nitrate, paint, paint thinner, gun powder, and fireworks. Therefore, individuals who issued this order should bear major responsibility for the disaster.

All factions, including Hizbollah, with a presence in the port knew of this practice but did nothing to clear the warehouse and transport the explosive materials to a safe, unpopulated site for destruction. Port officials had repeatedly warned of the dangers posed by these materials but these warnings went unheeded due to a pervasive culture of indifference and neglect.

Powerful politicians and parties have created fiefdoms at the port where they control the flow of goods and take commissions on imports and operations.

Although Hizbollah is among these fief holders it is not alone. All must assume a portion of the responsibility.

Considerable blame falls on Lebanon’s current regime — president, parliament and government — which consists of a coalition involving Hizbollah, its Shia Amal ally, President Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, and hangers-on. Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab were sent letters warning about the explosives by the port authorities on July 20th but did nothing. Aoun said this was not his responsibility although, as head of state, ultimate responsibility should be his. In his resignation speech, Diab blamed “corruption greater than the state.” Hizbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has dismissed culpability.  All are guilty. So, too, all Lebanon’s other political factions as they have taken their turn in power while the explosives were lodged in warehouse 12. This is why protesters, who have returned to Beirut’s streets, call for “All meaning all” to leave power.

For other equally guilty figures and factions, Hizbollah has become a convenient target in Lebanon’s domestic political blame game. These politicians and parties are simply seeking exculpation and an end to the threat to their grip on power posed by the popular protests. This is true also for their external supporters who do not want to lose influence if their allies are swept from the scene.

Hizbullah is a convenient culprit for several reasons.  The movement is demonised and branded a “terrorist” group by Israel, US and some European countries primarily due to its opposition to Israel.  The deployment of Hizbollah fighters on Damascus’ side in its civil and proxy conflicts has thwarted Syrian and external opponents’ efforts to overthrow the government. Hizbollah justifies its intervention by arguing it is protecting Lebanon from radical fundamentalists and local warlords who seek to destroy Syria and fracture the Levant. Lebanon is under pressure to “disassociate” from Syria’s wars but submission could lead to conflict in Lebanon.

Since mass protests against the country’s political elite erupted across Lebanon last October, Hizbollah has supported the status quo.

It has defended the political elite, which has mismanaged and corrupted the country for decades, and allowed, or dispatched, thugs to confront protesters.

Having emerged as a major political player, Hizbollah does not want to relinquish its gains. It fears the demands of demonstrators: reforms which would jeopardise its position and ultimate abandonment of the sectarian system of governance imposed by mandatory France before independence in 1943.

Due to its defence of the status quo and negative stance toward the protest movement, dubbed the “revolution,” Hizbollah has been losing popularity among Shias who have benefitted from its good works and who now face the collapse of Lebanon’s economy, destitution, Covid-19, and the impacts of devastation at Beirut port.

Since its creation with the assistance of Iranian Revolutionary Guards during Israel’s 1982 invasion and occupation of large swathes of Lebanon, Hizbollah has been seen as a “saviour” by many Shias. Hizbollah fought the Israelis, forced them to retreat to the southern border region and, in 2000, drove them out of the country. This was celebrated in Lebanon and all round the region as a great victory for the Arabs.

Hizbollah also established clinics, orphanages, and a large hospital in south Beirut and helped repair damage inflicted on southern towns and villages by the liberation struggle.  It is said Hizbollah has become a “state-within-a-state.” This is incorrect, Hizbollah simply provided protection and services normally assumed by a state but which had never been provided by Lebanon’s weak or non-existent state institutions.

Shias generally celebrated Hizbollah until it became part of the ruling elite and was tarnished by its faults and failures. The protest movement opened up fissures in Shia communities. Sanctioned by the West for its ties to Iran, Hizbollah lost revenue from wealthy Shias and could no longer provide welfare for poor Shias. Many Shias complained and have joined the protests. Young, educated Shias who see no future for themselves in bankrupted Lebanon have also taken part. This has rattled Hizbollah’s leaders who have always seen and projected their organisation as a “movement of the people.” This is no longer the case because Hizbollah, like all of the country’s poltical factions, has gained power by means of the obsolete sectarian political system which has brought Lebanon to its knees.  Lebanese, rightly, demand an end to this system which threatens Lebanon’s very existence as a country.