Elizabeth Shackelford, Tribune News Service
One of Joe Biden’s first messages to the world after the 2020 election was that America would lead “not by the example of our power, but by the power of our example.” Yes, the American example is a powerful tool of influence. But how is that example viewed across the globe?
The Eurasia Group Foundation set out to answer that question in its third annual international survey. It surveyed more than 5,000 people in 10 countries, including allies such as Japan and Germany and adversaries such as Russia and China. Conducted in March, the survey was an early look at views of America and American-style democracy under the Biden administration.
Three trends in the survey results stood out to me. The Biden administration would do well to consider them as it looks to reshape our country’s engagement in the world.
First, the United States gets the most bang for the buck out of its nonmilitary influence. The survey asked respondents from all 10 countries whether certain forms of US engagement had positive or negative influences on their countries. The list covered the sale of military weapons and vehicles, military collaboration, American-style education, American private foundations, US diplomats, US development support, American culture (movies, music, and television), American companies and consumer products.
Both forms of military assistance ranked lowest for positive influence. This means that nonmilitary tools, often referred to as “soft power,” bring the US more good will and influence globally.
Familiarity and connections with the United States and its culture were also powerful positive influencers. People who had recently traveled to the United States or had a friend or family member there were far more likely to have a positive opinion of the US, while those with little or no association with the US or its culture were more likely to hold anti-American sentiments.
Why, then, does the US spend so much more money and effort on military tools and engagement? And how could we promote cultural, economic and educational ties — ties that ultimately feed into our local economies and businesses too? These are some questions the Biden administration should ask.
Second, our costly military commitments to treaty allies aren’t boosting our reputation. The United States has 55,000 troops stationed in Japan, 36,000 in Germany and 5,500 in Poland. These outposts might reassure our allies’ governments, but they do little to reassure the local public. When asked whether US military involvement in their region promotes stability, citizens of Germany, Japan and Poland were unenthusiastic. Majorities in Germany and Japan either disagreed or had no opinion. US military involvement was valued higher in Poland, but hardly by a landslide, with only 53.2% agreeing that it promoted stability.
Respondents were similarly apathetic about whether the United States had positively influenced their region in the past 20 years. In Germany and Japan, more than half either believed US influence made little or no difference or had been negative. Poland was more evenly split, with a slight majority finding it positive.
Of the 10 countries surveyed, the two with the biggest US military footprint — long-standing US allies Germany and Japan — had the lowest overall favorability ratings of the US as a country and of American-style democracy, even lower than perceptions held by respondents in Russia or China.
This is my third takeaway. Biden was right when he told Congress that America must prove to the world that our style of democracy still works.
All this says that we should lean in on those things that the world already favours about America, from development and diplomacy to culture and commerce. For example, we could pare down our troop commitments in friendly countries and use the money saved to boost educational outreach and cultural engagement.
Surveys are imperfect. But this one jibes with my experience as a US diplomat overseas.
Everywhere I represented the United States, an affinity for America endured, even during difficult years and alongside growing concerns about our military adventurism. In Nigeria, I interviewed students eager to study in American schools. In South Sudan, activists sought our advice on protecting a free press and building an active civil society. In Somalia, politicians sought to recreate the US House and Senate. (I had my own doubts about whether our Congress was something others might want to mimic.)
The power of our example was evident to me then, even at times when it was more promise than reality. If President Biden is serious about leading by example over force, we could improve not just our reputation but our influence around the world.