Hegemonistic ambitions over northern Cyprus

In response to the US decision to end its arms embargo on the Cyprus republic, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced his intention to reinforce the Turkish military presence in occupied northern Cyprus. He said the US policy change will encourage the “Cypriot-Greek duo that threatens peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean and will lead to an arms race on the island.”

Reaffirming Turkey’s commitment to the “security of Turkish Cypriots,” he stated mainland Turkish troops already based in the north will be boosted by land, naval, and aerial forces, equipment and munitions. The 40,000 troops he said were on the island are 10,000 more than the UN estimate of 30,000 and far above the ratio of 3-to-one laid down by military experts as the correct deployment for attackers to defenders.

His statement was in response to Washington’s announcement of an end to defence trade restrictions imposed on the Cyprus republic in 1987. According to Nazlan Ertan writing on US-based Al Monitor, this shift “rewards” Cyprus for “cooperating with the US against money laundering and denying Russian military vessels access to ports for refuelling and servicing.” These actions contribute to international sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.

Erdogan has called on Washington to reverse its decision, arguing it upsets the military balance in the eastern Mediterranean. However, there is no balance. Turkey is a NATO power and has the second largest standing army in the world, after the US.

Turkey’s armed forces consist of 775,000 troops, its military budget is $80 billion, and it possesses a vast arsenal of weaponry as well as a navy and airforce.

The Cyprus republic’s national guard consists of 10,000 conscripted youths rotated on a 14-month basis and 50,000 reservists who have a few days of retraining annually. Cyprus has a limited arsenal procured mainly from Europe and Russia, no war ships and no air force. Nicosia is unlikely to begin buying US materiel because of existing contracts. The republic’s military budget for 2020 was $414 million.

The Greek military is 130,000 conscripts strong, with 220,500 in the reserves. The navy and airforce are equipped with modern weapons and the annual budget is $4 billion. In recent years the main task of the Greek armed forces has been to defend the Aegean islands and the country’s territorial waters from Turkish incursions. Greece does not have the capacity or capability to protect the Cyprus republic, an hour and a half away by air, from Turkish attack.

Cypriot foreign minister Ioannis Kasolides warned in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that Turkey’s deployments in the north could drag the republic into escalating Turkish-Greek tension over the Greek islands in the Aegean. This spiked after Greece sent US-manufactured armoured vehicles to Lesbos and Samos which, according to Mr. Erdogan, should be demilitarised. Although a NATO member Greece’s armed forces do not come anywhere near the strength of the Turkish military.

This became abundantly clear in 1974 when Turkey invaded and occupied northern Cyprus following a failed coup against President Makarios mounted by the Greek military junta. Since then Cyprus has been divided between the internationally recognised Greek-Cypriot majority republic and the breakaway Turkish-Cypriot entity recognised only by Turkey. In violation of international law, Ankara has encouraged 181,000 mainland Turks to live in northern Cyprus where they are a majority and resented by the 145,000 native Turkish Cypriots.

This being the case, why has Erdogan adopted this tough line now? Erdogan and his ruling fundamentalist party have a problem with the Turkish Cypriots. This was accentuated by the signing in April of a controversial protocol which would provide residents of north Cyprus with $235 million this year in exchange for restrictions which will limit freedom of expression, undermine civil society, and promote the role of religion.

The protocol is seen by a majority of Turkish Cypriots as a means of formalising the annexation of north Cyprus by Turkey. The 53-page document opens with the declaration that “the island of Cyprus has been a part of Anatolia politically and culturally since 1571,” the year of the Ottoman conquest. The independent Turkish Cypriot daily Yeniduzen called the protocol “an agreement to surrender.” Adding more troops could secure this objective. On Saturday, Turkish Cypriots protested against the construction of a $140 million government complex, Erdogan’s pet project, near the Green Line dividing the island. They demanded the money should be invested in schools and welfare payments

Most Turkish Cypriots want independence from Turkey and federation with the republic. This demand has strengthened since Turkey’s economy began to tank in 2018, causing rising dislocation and suffering among Turkish Cypriots. They have to use dollars and euro to pay rents and buy cars and home appliances while being paid in the devaluating Turkish currency. Despite the economic meltdown, the majority of the mainland Turkish majority backs Erdogan.

On the Turkish domestic front, he believes that taking a tough line against the Cyprus republic and Greece could deflect the attention of Turkish voters from their financial troubles and garner votes for him in next year’s presidential election. This is unlikely as the Turkish public is focused on bread and butter rather than foreign affairs.

A large percentage of Turks resents the 3.5 million Syrian refugees Erdogan welcomed when they arrived in Turkey following the 2011 unrest which morphed into proxy warfare. Resentful Turks, who partially blame Syrians for Turkey’s downward slide, demand their repatriation or deportation.

Erdogan’s political rivals are exploiting this issue.

His approval rating has fallen to 41.5 per cent and 53 per cent disapprove of his performance.

Six opposition parties have joined together to put forward a candidate who might be able to oust Erdogan in the June 2023 election. It remains to be seen whether they will stick together and whether a second opposition coalition, led by the pro-Kurdish democratic party, will support the six or field its own candidate.

Since Erdogan is no longer seen as the favourite, he seeks to regain his standing by risky foreign adventures in the Aegean and north Cyprus. Due to US, Russian, Syrian and Iranian opposition he appears to have dropped his plan to mount a new invasion of northern Syria with the aim of settling Syrian refugees in Turkish-controlled enclaves along the border.