The meeting of the QUAD leaders from Australia, India, Japan and the United States, hosted by American President Joe Biden, his last before he demits office in January 2025, had announced a joint coastal guard exercise to enhance maritime security of the group. No details were forthcoming except that coast representatives of the four countries will join on a US Coast Guard vessel.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese explained that the personnel of the four coast guards spending time together will increase the ‘inter-operability’ of the security systems of the member countries. The group had not named China but the meeting began with an American report on China.
Biden had said that China was shifting tactics but strategy and Beijing continues to test the United States in the South and East China Sea and in Taiwan Strait. The American president went on to say, “We believe (Chinese President) Xi Jinping is looked to focus on domestic economic challenges and minimise the turbulence in China diplomatic relationships, and he’s also looking to buy himself some diplomatic space, in my view, to aggressively pursue China’s interest.”
Biden sees the QUAD as his legacy and he is confident that it will stand. Of the four leaders, it is only Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi who will be in office for the next five years because he has returned to power on the back of a coalition in the summer parliamentary election. Biden is leaving office after the November 5 presidential election as he has stepped down from the contest. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will be stepping down as he will not be contesting the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), leadership contest. Albanese faces parliamentary election next year.
American experts have noted that India does not look at the QUAD as a military alliance, but the Americans think that India must engage in the QUAD’s security aspects. India has not been a member of any military alliance since it became independent in 1947. American security expert Lisa Curtis argues, “But I think China’s recent maritime aggression could be changing the equation for India and could be prompting India to become a bit more open to the idea of QUAD security cooperation.”
But given India’s stated foreign policy it is unlikely that New Delhi will accept the QUAD as a military group. American commitment to Taiwan, and the close military ties between Australia, Japan with the United States, the security linkages between the three will be stronger. India remains the outsider, though New Delhi has been arguing that the South China Sea should remain a free region for international shipping to pass through. China has been asserting that South China Sea is part of its sphere of influence, and its own maritime sovereignty. It is this contention that makes it a bone of contention.
There is the big question whether the US will continue with QUAD if Republican candidate Donald Trump wins the presidential election. He has been against external entanglements of the US, and he is not much interested in challenging Chinese domination of the South China Sea. But the QUAD will remain relevant because all the member countries are apprehensive of the growing domination of China in south-east Asia and its assertion of right over the sea-lanes in the South China Sea.
And there are economic compulsions. Australia and Japan are hugely dependent on China’s markets for their products. The Indo-Pacific remains an area of strategic interest and concern for the United States, and China remains a rival at various levels, visible and invisible. China’s domination is also a matter of concern for other countries in the Indo-Pacific.