The Lebanon of today is different from the Lebanon of 2005

Last week’s verdict on the assassination of Lebanon’s ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri delivered by the Special Tribunal based near The Hague was a disappointment for those who wanted a clear cut ruling and closure. Instead, the verdict reopened wounds in an already deeply wounded country and could deepen divisions.

Instead of pronouncing a guilty verdict against all four Hizbollah members charged with the 2005 suicide bombing of Hariri’s motorcade that killed him and 21 others, the court convicted only Selim Ayyash. The other three accused were acquitted for lack of evidence proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The decisions of the court were explained over five gruelling hours when Justice David Re read out the verdict. The case, including portions on Ayyash, was based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from tracking cell phone calls among the men, who were, allegedly, monitoring Hariri’s movements for months.  The problem with the calls was that the tribunal did not have access to what was said. Ayyash was found to have had a central role in the conspiracy as he was accused of having contact with Hizbollah military leader Mustafa Badraddine who was seen as the mastermind of the operation. He was killed by an explosion in Damascus in 2016.

Ayash was also accused of purchasing the lorry that carried the explosives and of concocting a false claim of responsibility by a non-existent Sunni fundamentalist group.

The tribunal pointed out that both Syria and Hizbollah had motives to kill Hariri but their implication in the conspiracy could not be proven. The court did not declare their innocence so they have not been exonerated.

This was the best the Special Tribunal could do although it had been established in 2009 with the explicit aim of convicting Syria — and Hizbollah, Syria’s ally.

This did not happen because the Tribunal’s 11 judges and 400 staff members were and are professionals from multiple countries. They did not capitulate to the demands of Hariri’s supporters in Lebanon or the Western powers who were determined to lay the blame at Damascus door.

Investigations were mired in controversy as soon as international prosecutors were charged with investigating the assassination ahead of the creation of the Tribunal. Instead of looking at all possible culprits, the focus was on Syria. Jamil Sayyed, a former pro-Syrian general in Lebanese internal security who was detained as a suspect, cleared and released after four years, told al-Jazeera, “The goal was to “show that Syria and its allies killed Hariri and  (investigators) looked for evidence to support these claims.” The normal procedure in an investigation is to look for evidence to identify who is responsible for a crime.

Damascus was promptly accused because Hariri said he had been threatened by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after joining the anti-Syrian camp. It opposed the extension of the presidential term of Emile Lahoud whose term ended in 2004.  Hariri turned against Lahoud out when, instead of Hariri, he appointed Selim Hoss prime minister. Hoss’ government was one of Lebanon’s best. This camp also demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops and intelligence operatives from Lebanon. The Syrian army was deployed in 1976 early in the civil war at the request of then president Suleiman Frangie who sought to preserve the country’s sectarian power-sharing system of governance which was under challenge from the reformist camp led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. Considering Lebanon’s terrible situation today, it would have been better if the reformists had won then.

Syria denied the charge of killing Hariri and argued that he was due in Damascus the evening of his death with the aim of resolving differences. It happened that I went with friends to Damascus for a holiday two days after Hariri was murdered. I had no holiday.  After reporting to the press office in the Ministry of Information I was taken to meet the minister who insisted Hariri was expected to hold discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. I was told the same thing by Expatriates Minister Bouthaina Shaaban.

I then went to Beirut where I interviewed a UN official who met Hariri for coffee at the cafe L’Etoile near parliament minutes before he was slain.

Hariri told him he intended to go to Damascus in the evening. The cafe’s waiter offered to give the official the chair he had sat on as a memento of that encounter.

I also met Hariri’s sister Bahia who said she did not know if he planned to go to Damascus but considered it unlikely he would have rejected an overture from Syria. In a formal statement faxed to my hotel she said he wanted to have a “well-balanced relationship with Syria” which would “benefit both countries.”

Whether Syria was guilty or not, Assad was blamed.  Thousands of Lebanese took to the streets in a movement dubbed “The Cedar Revolution,” to protest the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon.  International pressure built for its withdrawal. In April, the last Syrian soldier left Lebanon.

Ironically,  Lahoud’s presidential term was extended until 2007.

The tribunal’s verdict on top of the August 4th explosions that wrecked Beirut’s port has prompted Hizbollah’s antagonists both at home and abroad to intensify claims that the Shia militant movement is solely responsible for Lebanon’s ills although all political figures and factions are to blame. Since the blast, Hizbollah’s opponents have claimed it  “controlled” the port although, again, all main political factions had fiefdoms there and benefited from corruption. As none of them acted to rid warehouse 12 of 2,700 tonnes of weapons grade ammonium nitrate stored alongside firecrackers, paint and paint thinner, all are guilty of the nearly 200 deaths and terrible destruction wreaked by the blast.

Maha Yahya, the director of the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut, said it felt as if the tribunal were “from a different era.” She is right. The Lebanon of today is quite different from the Lebanon of 2005.  While post-civil war mismanagement and corruption have soared, anti-establishment Hizbollah has become a major political and military power in the land and an aggressive defender of the status quo.

In 2006 the country suffered another Israeli invasion which was successfully repelled by Hizbollah, which provided Israel with a pretext by kidnapping and killing Israeli troops on patrol along the border.   Since then Hizbollah’s arms have deterred Israel from launching another disastrous Lebanese “adventure” but made many Lebanese uneasy about the presence of the movement’s paramilitary forces.

Since unrest and proxy war erupted in neighbouring Syria, Hizbollah prevented the conflict from spilling across the border into Lebanon and, with Russian air power and pro-Iranian ground troops, prevented rebels and radicals from overthrowing the Syrian government. This would have fractured Syria into warring fiefdoms and destabilised Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. Nevertheless, Hizbollah’s role in Syria has deepened the fears of its power among its opponents.

Hizbollah has also assumed political power by fielding candidates for parliament, supporting governments, and allying with President Michel Aoun.   This, along with its military prowess, has tipped the balance of power in Lebanon toward Iran, upsetting Arab and Western opponents of Tehran. Therefore, the blame-game focused on Hizbollah will continue, risking clashes and preventing Lebanon from ridding itself of its failed politicians and carrying out the reforms essential for rescuing its economy from ruin and its people from penury.