The Dhaka dilemma that New Delhi faces

About two weeks since Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to quit after violent protests over a controversial quota system for jobs, India has continued its policy of  ‘non-interference’ in its neighbour’s ‘internal’ affairs. However, since New Delhi views the developments across its border as impediments for its diplomatic, trade-connectivity and security influence, it will closely monitor the changes to ensure that problems in the neighbourhood do not hurt its own long-term national interests. Amid the Bangladesh army takeover in Dhaka, Sheikh Hasina – contrary to initial reports about seeking asylum in the United Kingdom – has continued to stay in India. While it was initially felt that Hasina’s presence in India would upset the next political dispensation in Dhaka, the new interim government in Dhaka stressed recently that this would not hurt bilateral ties.

If the Dhaka line holds good, it would help New Delhi repeat its policy of providing long-term refuge to Hasina and her family as it did within years after Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan, with India’s help, in 1971. India has always considered Hasina a close friend in a neighbourhood where its army confronts both Pakistan and China along hostile and disputed borders. The Indian Cabinet Committee on Security, which includes the prime minister, and internal, external, defence, and finance ministers, among others, has deliberated strategies to dilute the impact of the turmoil in the neighbouring country. This suggests that Bangladesh could be among the Indian government’s biggest foreign policy challenges after the border dispute with China in 2020.

While Indian official and media reports initially alleged that Pakistan and China influenced the goings-on in Bangladesh, there have also been accusations of Indian interference in the 2024 Bangladesh election. Subsequent narratives have, however, focused on how the goings-on could be more homegrown than otherwise.

Either way, there is little doubt that the moderate Islamic rule of Hasina will make way for parties promoting hardline religious values, like the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is less India-friendly. The role of Jamaat e Islami (JI) in the recent protests attracted particular attention. Hasina had suppressed the group for years and even banned it, along with its student wing.

The Bangladesh army chief had listed JI among the political parties to be consulted. BNP leader and former prime minister Khaleda Zia is also sympathetic to JI. She has accused India in the past of meddling in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. These factors will worry India, forcing it to delicately recalibrate its post-Hasina strategy.

Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had met about a dozen times in the recent past. The Bangladeshi leader had visited New Delhi in June for Modi’s third oath-taking ceremony as prime minister and again in July when bilateral agreements were signed for expanding cooperation in maritime security, ocean economy, space, and telecommunication sectors.

Hasina had deftly balanced ties with both India and China. At times, however, she had openly backed India’s interests, as was the case in July when she announced that Dhaka would prefer India executing a $1 billion river project instead of China.

In return, India had worked to dilute Hasina’s differences with Washington, which had branded Bangladesh’s elections as unfair. After her re-election a few months ago, amid an opposition boycott, Hasina had indirectly hinted that the United States was attempting to destabilise her government.

The Indian government has issued a ‘high alert’ along its long and porous border with Bangladesh. Many insurgent groups in the northeastern states of India had often taken sanctuary in Bangladesh in the past. With Hasina at the helm, and tacit support from New Delhi, Dhaka had discouraged Indian insurgent groups from using Bangladesh as a haven to destabilise India. This had ensured that India’s northeastern border was relatively calm.  Apart from fearing renewed insurgency, New Delhi is also worried about the potential influx of refugees seeking to escape violence in Bangladesh. It will equally monitor communal tension in Bangladesh with some protesters targeting houses and temples of minority communities in the past and in the recent violence. The new administration led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus has minced no words reiterating that violence against any religious or ethnic group will not be tolerated.

The Indian government’s  domestic politics has been particularly unpopular among the hardline Muslim groups in the Bangladesh opposition, which had criticised the Hasina government for overlooking India’s policies on one of its minority communities. In the economic realm, bilateral trade, billed at $13 billion in 2023, is likely to face trade disruptions in the short term. Moving forward, however, the new government in Dhaka is likely to continue bilateral multi-sectoral engagement with New Delhi. Overall, it is unlikely that New Delhi-Dhaka ties will witness the same level of political bonhomie as it did during the last decade and a half of Hasina’s rule. This, along with difficult ties with Pakistan, China and Maldives, among others — dubbed India’s ‘ring of fire’ — amplifies New Delhi’s neighbourhood dilemmas.