Demonstrators march during a protest in the city of Ramallah on Thursday, after the Hezbollah group confirmed reports of the killing of its leader Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli air strike in Beirut. AFP

Teams of Israeli military strategists, tacticians and intelligence operatives have long planned their campaign against Lebanon’s Hizbollah. Its opening of a second front in Israel’s deadly and devastating Gaza war was meant to put pressure on Israel and its US proxy to end the Gaza war. This failed. But the exchanges provided the opportunity  and cover for the Israelis to design attacks to eliminate Hizbollah. This will also fail as Hizbollah is deeply rooted in Lebanon.

 While Hizbollah and the Israeli army traded cross-border rocket and drone strikes calculated not to escalate into an Israeli war on Lebanon, Israeli planners began their campaign with systematic strikes against Hizbollah commanders with specific expertise and proceeded with 3,000 exploding pagers and walkie-talkies which killed 39 and wounded hundreds of Hizbollah fighters, administrators, and followers. While hits on commanders continued, Hizbollah stuck to the rules of engagement tacitly agreed on October 8th last year when the exchanges of fire began.

Claiming Hizbollah hid its arms and bombs in civilian garages and kitchens Israel struck villages, towns and cities in southern and eastern Lebanon, displacing tens of thousands of residents and creating chaos. Many flocked into the Dahiya stronghold in east Beirut which Israel bombed heavily on Friday night, targeting an alleged Hizbollah headquarters with US-provided Mark 84 2,000-pound (900 kilogramme) bombs, killing Hizbollah Secretary General Sayed Hassan Nasrallah. This strike was a temporary triumph for beleaguered Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu but will not be followed by victories in Lebanon or Gaza, the rescue of 97 Israelis held captive by Hamas in Gaza, or the return of 60,000 Israelis to their homes in northern Israel.

Nasrallah’s death does not bring an end to Hizbollah which has replacement leaders and commanders and 20,000 active fighters, at least 20,000 trained reservists and an estimated 150,000 ballistic missiles, rockets and armed drones with which to attack Israel. Nasrallah is likely to be succeeded by a clerical cousin, Hashem Safieddine, a senior member of Hizbollah’s Shura Council, who could come under local and Iranian pressure to step up attacks on Israel in revenge for Nasrallah’s assassination.                 Born in the Dahya in 1960, Hassan Nasrallah was educated in the Lebanese port city  of Tyre where he joined the Shia Amal movement. He taught at a Shia seminary in the eastern city of Baalbek before undertaking religious studies in Iran. He returned to Lebanon before Israel’s 1982 war on Lebanon and shifted to Shia factions which merged into Hizbollah. After Israel assassinated his predecessor Abbas Musawi, Hizbollah’s co-founder, Nasrallah, took over and  built the armed wing into a formidable fighting force with effective command-and-control and acquired a large arsenal of short- and long- range rockets, anti-tank missiles, and drones. Nasrallah had an impressive presence and considerable charisma. He was a towering politico-military figure among Lebanon’s squabbling politicians. Aware he risked assassination, he delivered his speeches from secret secure locations and did not appear in public for 18 years. His deputy, Naim Qassem, cannot match his expertise, presence and has no charisma.

Israel cannot escape blame for the emergence of Lebanon’s Hizbollah. Israel launched its first invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978 with the aim of driving Palestinian resistance forces north of the Litani river. The Israeli offensive, dubbed “Operation Litani,” was mounted in response to a battle with Palestinian (PLO) hijackers of an Israeli bus on the Tel Aviv-Haifa coastal highway. Thirty-eight civilians were killed and 71 wounded. During Operation Litani, hundreds of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and 20 Israeli troops were killed and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were driven from their homes and villages. 

The UN Security Council ordered Israel to withdraw its troops and established the UN Interim Emergency Force in Lebanon —  UNIFIL. However, Israel’s troops remained and counted on local support from the Maronite Christian South Lebanon Army militia created by defected Lebanese Army officer Saad Haddad who operated a notorious prison in the village of Khyam. Undeterred, Palestinian fighters based in the region north of the Litani river conducted strikes on Israeli and Haddad forces.

Despite an August 1991 ceasefire with the PLO, Israel’s army invaded Lebanon in June 1982,  drove the PLO from Lebanon and engineered the election to Lebanon’s presidency of Phalange party leader Bechir Gemayel, who was assassinated in September. Although the perpetrator was not Palestinian, Israeli troops surrounded the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila and ushered in Phalangist militiamen who massacred hundreds of Palestinians and Lebanese Shias. Meanwhile, Iranian Revolutionary Guards based in eastern Lebanon began training the Lebanese Shia youths who were the vanguard of Hizbollah which has become Iran’s major regional asset and Israel’s main opponent. 

Israel made the mistake of retaining an occupation zone north of the Lebanese border, generating anger and violent opposition from the region’s inhabitants and Hizbollah. It built up its forces and attacked Israeli troops and Haddad militiamen, forcing Israeli troops and allied militiamen to pull out in May 2000. Hizbollah was hailed in Lebanon and the region as the first Arab force to end an Israeli occupation. 

The euphoria did not last long. An overconfident Hizbollah attacked an Israeli patrol along the border in 2006, precipitating a third Israeli invasion of Lebanon which resulted in a standoff between the two sides. This is why Israel has tried to systematically undermine and weaken Hizbollah’s armed wing.  

But Hizbollah has built a movement with manor social and political importance. Modelled on the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, Shia Hizbollah has rooted itself in disadvantaged Shia communities in the south, the Bekaa, and south Beirut. Hizbollah operates clinics, a major hospital, schools, welfare organisations, and a construction firm. Hizbollah has become a major political party on the Lebanese scene.

After initially competing with the older Shia Amal organisation, Hizbollah has, for many years, collaborated with it and the two have formed the resistance bloc in Lebanon’s parliament. Hizbollah also nominates ministers in Lebanese governments.  Like Brotherhood-offshoot Hamas in Gaza, Hizbollah is a major actor on the local level and cannot be expurgated. While Israel has tried to erase Hamas in Gaza, Israel cannot afford to transform Lebanon into another Gaza, as Netanyahu has threatened to do.