Calls for calm after takeover of Damascus

While Ha’yat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) and disparate armed allies have called for calm and a smooth transition from the 54-year-old Assad dynasty, it remains to be seen if HTS can exert command and control. HTS might succeed if it treats its dramatic takeover of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and now Damascus as coup modelled on the frequent coups d’etat which predated the Assads. This meant figures at the top changed while the administration carried on normally.

Syrians were spared the unrest, looting, pillage of government offices and reprisals which often follow military and paramilitary revolts. If HTS fails, Syria could collapse into fiefdoms held by in-fighting warlords. This could destabilise the already unsettled Syrian-Iraqi heartland of the Eastern Arab World.

In an interview with CNN on Friday, HTS chief Abu Mohammed Jolani attempted to allay fears of this eventuality by suggesting that once institutions are in place militia factions would dissolve. However, this has not happened in the northwestern province of Idlib which has been run by HTS and other factions since 2017.

Also, on Friday before the fall of Damascus, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan admitted that the HTS offensive has created problems but stated, “Idlib, Hama, Homs and after that most probably Damascus ... we hope this march in Syria will continue without any issues.” Since he has been the key backer of HTS, he could have a positive role to play.

Erdogan’s involvement with Syria began in July 2011 with the establishment of the Free Syrian Army, a coalition of armed insurgent groups led by officers who defected from Syria’s military. In August, Ankara presided over the Istanbul-based formation of the Syrian National Council as the political arm of the opposition seeking to oust President Bashar Al Assad. Turkey has remained engaged throughout the past 13 years while Assad’s overstretched and under-resourced army has been backed by Russian airpower and pro-Iranian ground troops which melted away when HTS launched its offensive.

The takeover of northwestern Idlib province by pro-Turkish anti-government factions was complemented in the northeast by the occupation of 25 per cent of Syrian territory by the US-supported Kurdish militia known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Since 2016, Turkey has also directly occupied nearly 9,000 square kilometres of Syrian territory, including the Kurdish-majority northwest district of Afrin and 100 villages and the towns of al-Bab, Azaz, Jarabulus, Rajo, Tal Abyad, and Ras al-Ayn.

Fighting began to wind down in 2017 after the Syrian army’s recapture of eastern Aleppo from opposition fighters who fled to Idlib. By 2019, the frontlines were largely fixed. This was due to commitments made by Russia, Iran, and Turkey during high-level meetings in Astana, Kazakhstan, to de-escalate the Idlib situation. As long ago as 2019, all three parties expressed concern over the rise of HTS and “reaffirmed the determination” to ultimately eliminate Daesh, HTS and other groups branded as “terrorist” by the UN Security Council.

As Turkey is Idlib’s sole outlet and is the only member of the triumvirate with a military presence in Idlib, Ankara bore full responsibility to tackle HTS within Idlib. Instead, Turkey built up its assets and prepared for the surge. Meanwhile, Moscow and Tehran carried out their Astana obligations. Russian warplanes and pro-Iranian fighters aided Syrian ground forces to squeeze HTS and its allies into the western sector of Idlib. This enabled the Syrian army to take control of Idlib’s eastern sector through which the main N-5 highway from Damascus to Aleppo runs.

I drove along this highway when in April 2023 I travelled between Damascus and Aleppo. In eastern Idlib squat pistachio trees stretch across the land as far as the eye can see. I can testify that Aleppo was at peace with itself. The prosperous western side – which had remained under government control during the civil/proxy conflict – was comfortable. The historic souqs had been restored to pre-war state and the eastern side – which had been held by anti-government factions – had been largely repaired and was functioning normally.

Turkey had not only armed HTS and its surrogate Syrian National Army (the successor of the Free Syrian Army) but also chose an opportune moment for the offensive. The Syrian government’s allies, Moscow, Tehran, and Hizbollah have been weakened: Russia by its war in Ukraine, Iran by Israeli attacks on military posts hosting pro-Iranian militiamen in Syria, and Hizbollah by Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon.

To complicate the situation, Eastern Syria has also become chaotic. Turkey has threatened the US-backed Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which Ankara claims is an offshoot of Turkish Kurdish insurgents who have been fighting the Turkish government on and off since 1978. While the Syrian army focused on Aleppo, Hama and Homs in the west, the SDF has attacked government-held villages in eastern oil-rich Deir al-Zor province. Daesh has regrouped, revived, and mounted attacks near the ancient city of Palmyra. Insurgents have seized Deraa province in the south. Iraq has reinforced its border with Syria to prevent the return of Daesh, the sibling of HTS which emerged in Iraq as Jabhat al-Nusra during 2011-2012 under Abu Mohammed al-Jolani who now commands HTS.

Since 2017 HTS has dominated Idlib via the Syrian Salvation government which has created an administration to provide healthcare, education, and finances. The judiciary is dominated by armed factions which rely on competing versions of Muslim Sharia law. Courts have no clear guidance on judgements and abuses are said to be rife. HTS rules with an iron fist and does not tolerate dissent, stands accused of denying services to opponents and disappearing activists.

During 2014, Jolani told Al Jazeera that Syria should be ruled under his faction’s interpretation of Sharia and the interests of Christian, Druze, Ismaili Shia, Armenian and Alawite minorities would not be considered. Jolani has since softened this message. While insisting on Sharia, he has said minorities would not be “eliminated.” He has, however, been equivocal over the fate of the Alawite community of the ruling Assad family which has relied on secularism to accommodate all Syria’s religious communities.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria was originally caused by Assad’s refusal to change the country’s constitution to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in political life and be represented in parliament. Assad refused as the Brotherhood had in the 1970s conducted an insurgency with the aim of ousting the secular government. The insurgency became a fully-fledged revolt in June 1979 when pro-Brotherhood military officers carried out a massacre of cadets at the Aleppo Artillery School. The Brotherhood followed up by staging large-scale urban protests and mounted attacks which killed hundreds of people. The revolt ended in 1982 when government forces crushed a Brotherhood-led insurrection in Hama; thousands were killed. The memory of these events has made many older Syrians leery of the Brotherhood and al-Qaeda offshoots like HTS.