Why Israel failed to prevent October 7 attack

Israeli investigations into the October 7th, 2023, attack on southern Israel have revealed how its and domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet, and army failed to identify Hamas’ intentions and pre-empt the raid that killed 1,200 and precipitated all-out retaliatory war on Gaza. At the end of last month, the army admitted its failure “in its mission to protect Israeli civilians” while last week Shin Bet published the results of its probe.

Shin Bet admitted failure to predict and prevent the Hamas attack. The Israeli liberal daily Haaretz said the agency had “correctly assessed” the serious threat posed by Hamas but did not use its knowledge to warn the government of the danger Israel faced in the days or hours before the attack. However, Haaretz reported that in May 2023, Shin Bet head Ronen Bar told Netanyahu that Hamas was a “challenge at (Israel’s) doorstep” and it should prepare for “an opening blow.” Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu dismissed this warning and said Israel had deterred Hamas with “a strong balance of fear.” Netanyahu prioritised his policy of allowing funds from abroad to flow to Hamas for payment of salaries to Gaza’s civil servants. This policy was meant to strengthen Hamas in its competition with Fatah in the West Bank and divide Palestinians.

Both Shin Bet and the army were alerted to 2018 and 2022 Hamas plans for attacks but did not follow through in 2023 by looking for signs such an operation was nearing launch. Information did not reach senior Shin Bet and army officers who did not coordinate and share assessments. Shin Bet agents in Gaza itself did not inform Israel of preparations for the attack. Despite the scandal, Shin Bet boss Bar has declared he has no intention of resigning and, according to Haaretz, would resist Netanyahu’s calls for his dismissal.

The army’s probe revealed that the high command believed Hamas did not want war and, in case of attack, Israel would have time to respond. The Israeli army has not been seriously challenged for decades and has relied largely on airpower to counter attacks from Gaza. The army has, instead, focused on the West Bank and Hizbollah in Lebanon. In the days just before the Hamas raid, male commanders ignored warnings that Hamas was preparing an operation by female “spotter” soldiers posted along the Israeli border with Gaza. Several of the women were killed and others taken captive when Hamas fighters swept into Israel.

In January this year, Israel’s army chief Herzl Halevi and southern command head Yaron Finkelman resigned. Halevi admitted “the responsibility is mine” as commander of the army and assumed part of the blame for mistakes made by subordinates. Addressing the ceremony marking the hand-over to a new army chief, Netanyahu said that Israel must “achieve the aims of the war in full: “the elimination of Hamas and return of all remaining hostages.” Incoming chief-of-staff General Eyan Zamir vowed, “Victory over Hamas” and praised the Israeli people for rising and proving “their power in the moment of truth.”

The army investigation said that a total of 5,000 Hamas fighters entered Israel on October 7th, with a vanguard of more than 1,000 seasoned fighters crossing the border under heavy fire. They silenced Israel’s communication and command-and-control systems, creating chaos. Around 2,000 arrived in the second wave along with hundreds of civilians, the probe reported. Such large numbers would explain why Hamas fighters quickly overpowered Israeli forces in the area. Hamas has denied these figures and said that only a few hundred of its fighters were involved.

On fatalities and wounded, Haaretz said the army may have fired on Israeli civilians to prevent them from being seized by Hamas in accordance with the “Hannibal procedure” which allows troops to shoot fellow soldiers. On this occasion, Haaretz said kidnapped civilians were at risk at three locations. Some were said to have been killed.

Faced with the results of these probes Netanyahu has refused a court-appointed independent investigation into Israel’s failures to anticipate and ward off Hamas’ assault. Israel’s supreme court has called for a state commission of inquiry, echoing Knesset members who have long demanded such an investigation. While Netanyahu has called for a state inquiry, he has argued it must investigate the “deep state” bureaucracy, cabinet leaks and the media. His aim is to draw the focus away from himself and evade responsibility for what happened.

His office said it had received a non-urgent army memo describing suspicious Hamas actions three hours before the attack but did not pass on the information to Netanyahu’s staff. This behaviour demonstrated the overconfident attitude adopted by Israel when assessing threats and lax behaviour in the army command, the defence ministry, and prime minister’s office. Netanyahu — who held the top job from 2009 to 2021 and from early 2023 — has refused to admit blame for failing to prevent October 7th. During his time in office, Netanyahu took a relaxed attitude toward Hamas as he believed Israel’s relationship with the movement had stabilised.

Netanyahu has been accused of postponing the reckoning for October 7th by saying this cannot take place until the Gaza war ends. Critics say his self-interested determination to cling to power has prolonged the deadly and destructive war and the ordeal of the Israeli captives.

Netanyahu has appointed Secretary of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer to head ceasefire negotiations and sidelined Bar and external intelligence agency Mossad chief David Barnea who had taken part in talks in Doha and Cairo. Dermer is a Netanyahu loyalist. He does not trust Bar or Barnea. Leaks to the press revealed that once the team made deals with Hamas via the Egyptian and Qatari mediators, Netanyahu repeatedly put forward new demands, undermining the process of reaching a ceasefire. Netanyahu has now refused to advance from the first phase of the January ceasefire-hostageprisoner release agreement as the second phase is meant to conclude with an end to the Gaza war and Israeli withdrawal from the devastated strip.